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fL. A. No. 24855. In Bank. Nov. 18, 1958.]
'JOHN W. SCOTT, Respondent, v. WINIFRED C. SCOTT,
Appellant.

: [1J Div,oree-Foreign Deeree&-E1fect of Prior Decree for Separate Maintenanee.-Although there is a subsisting separate
maintenance decree, another jurisdiction can grant a divorce
to one of the parties and validly terminate the relation of
husband and wife.
1[2] ld.-Foreign Deeree&-llona Fides of ltesidenee.-A finding'
that plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Mexico at the time he
procured a second divorce decree from his first wife was sustained by evidence that he had resided there for approximately 18 months, that he was unable to work except that he
was writing books and short stories while in Mexico, that he
was a retired Army officer whose pension was not sufficient
to support him in the United States and he therefore lived
in Mexico, that he leased a residence in Mexico and bis furniture had been there for a long time and was there at the
time of trial, and that he expected to return to Mexico when
the litigation was terminated and live there the rest of his life.
[S] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-Validity-Full Faith and Credit.-A
second divorce decree which plaintiff procured in Mexico from
his first wife was valid where a Mexican attorney, whoqualiiled as an expert on the laws of Mexico, testifl.ed that he examined the divorce proceedings and the decree granted and
that under the laws of Mexico plaintiff had been granted a
valid divorce decree which would be recognized all over
Mexico, thus making applicable the general rule that where a
party has established a bona llde residence in Mexico and
obtained a Mexican divorce decree, such decree is entitled to
full faith and credit in California.
['] Id.-Foreign Deeree&-1njunctioDB Against.-Where an ex
parte injunction restraining plaintiff from proceeding with a
second divorce action in Mexico was issued some weeks after
a her.ring in such' proceeding in :which plaintiff personally
testifl.ed and such injunction was never served on him and
he had no personal knowledge of it until after the divorce
was granted, .the injunction could not invalida,te the divorce
decree.
[1] See Ca1.J'ur.2d, Divorce and Separation, t 312 et seq.; Am.
.J'ur., Divorce and Separation, § D41 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 305; [2J Divorce, § 306;
[3, 4] Divorce, § 304; [5] Injunctions, § 14; [6] Divorce, § 306.1.
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[6] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-An injunction cannot be granted to prohibit an act that has already
occurred.
[6] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Res Judicata.-A ruling denying
plRintiff's application for modification of a separate maintenance decree was not res judicata in a declaratory relief action
on the question of the validity of a second Mexican divorce
decree from plaintiff's first wife where, in denying the application for modification, the trial court made a finding that, for
the purposes of that hearing, there was no findings as to the
vnlidity or invalidity of the Mexican divorce decree.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los·
Angeles County. Newcomb Condee, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for plaintiff af-;
firmed.
Monta W. Shirley and George W. Nilsson for Appellant.
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and E. Loyd Saunders for Re-'
spondent.
McCOMB, J.-Defendant Winifred C. Scott appeals from
a judgment ill a declaratory relief action decreeing that a
divorce procured by plaintiff from her in the District of
Bravos, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico, on March
17, 1956, was valid.
. CHRONOLOGY

i. January 10, 1931, plaintiff and defendant Winifred
were married.
ii. July 9, 1948, they separated.
iii. In 1952 plaintiff procured a Mexican divorce from
Winifred in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico.
iv. December 5, 1952, plaintiff married defendant Elli
Scott.
v. December 11, 1952, Winifred filed a separate maintenance action against plaintiff in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.
vi. May 9, 1953, the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County awarded Winifred separate maintenance and held i
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Injunctions, § 18; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 6
et seq.
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that the Mexican divorce decree procured by" plaintiff in
1952 was invalid.
vii. In January 1955 plaintiff, having retired from the
United States Army, went to Gnadalajara, in the State of
·J alisco, Republic of Mexico, and employed an attorney to
,obtain another divorce from Winifred. The attorney filed an
action in the State of Jalisco, but the judge refused to hear'
· the case, saying that, so far as he was concerned, the Mexican
· divorce which plaintiff had procured in 1952 was valid and
· that plaintiff could obtain a rehearing on it only under an: other set of circumstances and charges in the State of
: Chihuahua.
: viii. In January 1956 plaintiff went back to Juarez, in
:the State of Chihuahua, and filed a complaint for divorce
against Winifred, a copy of which was served upon her by
mail in Omaha, Nebraska. The hearing in this divorce proceeding was held on January 14,1956, at which time plaintiff
personally testified therein.
ix. March 2, 1956, the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, upon the application of defendant Winifred, after
service by mail on plaintiff, issued the following injunction:
"IT Is THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant, JOHN W. SCOTT, his servants and his agents, be
permanently restrained and enjoined from proceeding with,
and from maintaining the validity of, any divorce proceeding, or divorce decree obtained, in that certain proceeding
instituted by defendant herein on or about the 16th day of
January, 1956, against plaintiff herein for a divorce in the
Second Civil Court, City of Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, the
copies of the Summons and Complaint in said proceedings
having been served upon the plaintiff herein on or about the
25th day of January, 1956, as is more fully described in the
Affidavit of Winifred C. Scott in Support of Injunction on
file herein."
x. March 17, 1956, defendant Winifred having failed to
appear in the action, another decree of divorce was granted
to plaintiff from her by the Mexican court in the State of
· Chihuahua.
xi. July 26, 1956, plaintiff filed an application in the Los
Angeles Superior Court separate maintenance action seeking a
modification of the support decree, alleging that he had procured a divorce from Winifred in Mexico. on March 17, 1956.
In August 1956 the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
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made an order denying plaintiff's application for a modification of the support d('crl'(' and mail!', among others, this finding: "That the Decree of Divorce obtained by the defendant
in the State of Chihuahua on :March 17, 1956, is contrary to i
aud is in violation of the injunction issued against the defendant in this action on March 2, 1956, whereby the defendant was restrained from proceeding with any divorce proceedings instituted in the City of Juarez, State of Chihuahua,
Mexico. . .. For the purposes of this hearing, there is no
finding as to the validity or the invalidity of the Mexican
decree of divorce obtained by the defendant from the plaintiff
on March 17,1956. . . . " (Italics added.)
xii. August 23, 1956, plaintiff filed the present action for
declaratory relief, alleging that he had procured a valid decree of divorce from Winifred on March 17, 1956. Winifred
filed an answer to the complaint, and after trial the court
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, declaring:
"A. That the Judgment of Divorce between John W. Scott,
the plainti1I, and Winifred C. Scott, the defendant, dated
March 17, 1956, in the State of Chihuahua, Republic of
Mexico, is a valid and subsisting divorce.
"B. That Winifred C. Scott is not the wife of John W.
Scott, and that the defendant Elli Scott is the wife of John
W. Scott.
"C. That there is the relation, the rights and duties of
husband and wife as between the plaintiff, John W. Scott, and
the defendant Elli Scott."
Questiom: First. Was the second Mexican decree of divorce
procured by plaintiff from defendant Winifred O. 8coff invtJlid because there was a mbsisting ,eparate maintenance
decree 'between the parties on March 17, 1956, Ihe date 'aid
'BeOM Mexican decree was entered'
No. [1] The following rule is here applicable:
Although there is a subsisting separate maintenance decree,
another jurisdiction can grant a divorce to one of the parties
and validly terminate the relation of husband and wife.
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 {68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. I
1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 1412], a wife procured a separate main-I
tenance decree in New York. Thereafter the husband went
to Nevada and, npon constructive service, was granted an
ex parte Nevada divorce decree.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit, saying.
at page 546: "The State has a considerable interest in prevent-
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ing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of
marriages from being bastardized" and again, at page 549:
"Thc result in this situation is to make the divorce divisibleto givc effect to thc Nevada decrce insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It
accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New York in
this broken marriage by restricting each State to the matters
of her dominant concern." (See also Worthley v. Worthley,
44 Ca1.2"d 465, 468 [2] [283 P.2d 19].)
[2] Second. Was plai1ltiff a bona fide resident of Me:tico
on March 17, 1956'
Yes. The trial court found that plaintiff was a bona fide
resident of Mexico on March 17, 1956, when he procured the
second decree of divorce from Winifred.
This finding is amply supported by the following evidence
in the record: (a) Plaintiff had resided in Mexico from January 5, 1955, to about July 1956; (b) he was unable to work,
except that he was writing books and short stories while in
Mexico; (c) he was a retired Army officer, whose pension was
not sufficient to support him in the United States, and he
therefore lived in Mexico, where his expenses were less; (d)
he leased a residence in Mexico, and his furniture had been
there for a long period of time and was there at the time of
trial; and (e) he expected to return to Mexico when the
present litigation was terminated and live there the· rest of
his life.
[3] Third. Was the aecond divorce decree which plaintiff
procured in M e:tico a valid divorce decree'
Yes. A Mexican attorney who qualified as an expert on
the laws of Mexico testified that he had examined the divorce
proceedings and the decree granted March 17, 1956, and that
under the laws of Mexico plaintiff had been granted a valid
decree of divorce ft:om Winifred, which decree would be
recognized in the State of Chihuahua and allover Mexico.
This being true, the general rule is" applicable that where a
party has established a bona fide residence in Mexico and
obtained a Mexican decree of divorce, such decree is entitled
to full faith and credit in California. (Cf. DeYou1lg v. DeYoung, 27 Ca1.2d 521, 524 [1] et seq. [165 P.2d 457].)
[4] Fourth. Did the injunction which was granted on
March :!, 1956, invalidate the divorce decree of March 17,
1956'
No. The ex parte injunction restraining plaintiff from pro-
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ceeding with the second divorce action ill Mexico was never
served on him, and he had no personal knowledge of it until
after the divorce had becn grantcd. Thc injunction was issued
Oil :March 2, 19G6, but the hearing in the diYorce proceeding
had becn held some weeks prior to that time, with plaintiff
personally testifying therein, on January 14, 1956. Therefore,
the California court purported to enjoin plaintiff from taking
action which he had already taken. [5] Obviously an injunction cannot be granted to prohibit an act which has
already occurred.
[6] Fifth. Was the ru.ling of the Oolifortlia court denying
plaintiff's applicaHoll for a modification of the separate maintenance decree res judicata in the present action on the qtWStion of the 'Validity of the second Mexican divorce decree'
No. In denying plaintiff's application for a modification
of the separate maintenance decree, the trial court made thc
following finding: "For the purposes of this hearing, thcrc
is no finding as to the validity or the invalidity of the Mexican decree of divorce obtaiIled by the defendant from the
plaintiff on March 17, 1956."
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spencf', J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment.
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court determines
what effect state courts will accord judgments of courts of
sister states.
As to judgments of courts of foreign countries, however,
state courts have generally held that state law is controlJing in
the absence of treaties or federal legislation. (See Reesf', The
Status in Tltis Oountry of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
Columbo L. Rev. 783, 787.) For the most part they have followed the rules applicable to judgments of courts of sister
states. Given the customary invocation of domicile as the
touchstone of divorce jurisdiction in this country, they have
generally invoked it also as to divorce decrees of courts of
foreign countries. They have refused to recognize such de- '
crees, absent the domicile of either party in the other country,
even when that country does 110t require domirile as a ba:;;is
for divorce. (See 28 N.Y.U.I.J.Rev. 742, 743-745.)
Critics, however, have pointed out that a country other than
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,the domi('jJe may have a lp.gifimRfr. int.erp8t. in the mariiaI
i status of thc partics, eYCll though it does 110t accept the comimon law jurisdictional concept of domicilc. (See Howe, The
:Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York Statc,
40 Columb.L.Rev. 373, 3i5-376; 40 CaUJ.Rev. 93, 99-100.)
Likewise the New York courts recognize civil law decrees
obtained without domicile in the country of the court issuing
the decree (e.g., G01lld v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14 (138 N.E. 490])
.and, under certain circumstances, the English courts do not
make domicile a condition for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree. (E.g., Travers v. Holley [1953], P. 246; see
;Manning v. Manning [1958], 2 W.L.R. 318; Mann, The Royal
:Commission of Marriage and Divorce: .Jurisdiction of the
!English Courts and Recognition of Foreign Decrees, 21 Modern L.Rev. 1; Armitage v. Attorney General (1906], P. 135;
Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and RecognitiO'n of Divorce
Decrces-A Comparative Study, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 193.) .
This court has never expressly ruled on the question whether
a finding of domicile is prerequisite to the recognition in this
state of a divorce decree rendered abroad. 1 Although there
was a finding of domicile in this case, there should be no implication from the court's opinion herein that would preclude
contacts with the foreign country other than domicile as a
basis of jurisdiction.
Section 1915 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "A
final judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction, according to the laws of sUch country, to
pronounce the judgment, shall have the same effect as in the
country where rendered, and also the same effect as final judgments rendered in this state." (Italics added.) The first
task of the eourt is thus to determine whether or not the
I

: 1In DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521 [165 P.2d 457], we "usumed
without deciding" that a divorce decree of a :Mexican court could be collaterally attacked here if the plaintift' had not been domiciled in the juris·
diction granting the divorce. In Redi"ker v. Rediker. 35 Cal.2d 796 [221
P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], we did not find it necessary to decide whether
a foreign divorce decree could be attacked on these grounds, since it
was to be assumed in tile absence of evidence to the contrary that the
plaintiff was a. bona fide resillent of Cuba and that therefore the foreign
court had jurisdiction even jf measured by our standards.
The District Courts of Appeal of this state have denied recognition
to divorce decrees of a foreign country when domicile was lacking, even
though the foreign country did not require domicile as a basis for divorce
jurisdiction. (Sec, e.g., Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cnl.App.2d 426 r37 P.2d 1069];
Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657 [161 P.2d 490].) These eases
should be disapproved insofar as they make domicile a sine qua non of
.recognition.
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rnT(·j~11 rour!. bad jl1ri8diction under tbe laws of its own;
c,olll1try. The prohlcm js nol aUlomatically settled, however,
if there is a determination that there was jurisdiction. The
court must then go on to determine whether recognition of the:
foreign decree would violate due process limitations or estab-'
lished local policy, for we cannot assume that in section 1915
the" Legislature meant to override such limitations or policy.
If there is no such violation, a decree of divorce that is valid
according to the laws of the foreign country should be recognized here. (See Ruiz, The Effect of Section 1915 of the
Code of Civl,£ Procedure on Migratory Divorces Procured in
Foreign Countries, 13 So.Cal.L.Rev. 294; Ehrenzweig, Survey
of California Law 1950·1951, Conflicts of Laws, 141-142.)
There is no reason to read any requirement of domicile
or bona fide residence into the statute. The status of persons
as married or not married should be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. The valid judgments of courts of other countries should therefore be respected unless they run counter
to local policy. The public policy of California may not permit the recognition of a foreign divorce decree when the
foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the marital
status of the parties, when the sole purpose of seeking the
divorce in a foreign court is to evade the laws of this state
(see Civ. Code, §§ 150-150.4), or when the divorce is ex parte
without reasonable notice to the defendant. No such problem
arises in the present case, since plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Mexico, neither party was a resident of California,
and the defendant had reasonable notice.

Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
,17,1958.
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